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Banking Across Borders
Since the 1980s, many of the largest banks in the world have
increased their foreign activities dramatically. Currently, international
capital and banking markets are more intertwined than ever, making
a correct assessment of the costs and benefits of internationalization
a serious matter for bank management, regulators as well as share-
holders. This study contributes to a better understanding of the inter-
nationalization of banks. The study appraises to what extent banks
internationalized because of internal, institutional or sectoral incen-
tives. The internationalization strategies of the world’s largest banks
in eight countries between 1980 and 2000 are described and analyzed.
These banks have dominated the internationalization of banking.
Strategic commonalities and differences are identified on the basis
of a strategic typology developed for this study. 
The central research question deals with the effectiveness of interna-
tionalization. Using a self constructed internationalization database,
differences are estimated between foreign and domestic performance,
and the effects on shareholder return. A higher degree of internatio-
nalization has on average not contributed to bank performance.
Similarly, most shareholders have not gained by more internationa-
lization.
The study also tries to address the future outlook for international
banking - how will the internationalization of banks proceed? The
potential for further financial deregulation in the home country,
uncertainty on the international regulatory regime, and the business
mix of the bank are likely drivers for the bank’s future internationa-
lization strategy and profitability enhancement.
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1 Executive Summary 
• Since the early 1980s banks internationalized on an unprecedented scale. To 
understand whether international expansion has affected the banks´ operations, and 
identify if additional performance and shareholder return was created by 
internationalization, this study analyzes the internationalization strategies and 
financial performance of the world's largest banks from eight countries between 1980 
and 2000. This amounts to the study of a total of 44 banks.  
 
• In the 1980s the overall degree of internationalization for the whole sample basically 
did not change much. In the 1990s, the degree of internationalization systematically 
increased, but the increase was concentrated with a small number of banks. For the 
bank sample as a whole, internationalization has not led to higher profitability levels. 
Even though the banks in the sample have been amongst the largest and leading 
internationalisers, most have not been in a situation to profit from this strategic choice.  
 
• The largest banks, however, have not pursued uniform internationalization strategies. 
Retreating as well increasingly internationalstrategies could be observed. In the 1980-
2000 period, around one quarter of the banks faced a stagnent level of 
internationalization, one quarter retreated, while one quarter slowly and one quarter 
strongly internationalized.  
 
Shifting incentives to internationalize 
 
• This study established a relationship between incentives to internationalize and the 
degree of internationalization. Following the client as a commonly known incentive to 
internationalize in service sectors, had explanatory power in the 1990s but not in the 
1980s. No relationship with foreign direct investments was found. Net interest 
margins were a determining factor for banks to internationalize in the 1980s. In the 
1990s this shifted towards fee income.  
 
• Financial development was found to be positively related to the degree of 
internationalization for continental European banks, but negatively related to the 
United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom, the countries with the world's largest 
financial centers and securities markets. A higher degree of market concentration 
proved to be positively related to the degree of internationalization. Furthermore 
individual banks' degree of internationalization tended to be sensitive to the overall 
degree of internationalization of the whole sector, which is an indication of herding 
behavior amongst banks. Incentives such as profitability, capitalization and efficiency 
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also explained the degree of internationalization. These incentives tended to explain 
internationalization better for the 1990s than in the 1980s.    
 
Results from internationalization on average disappointing 
 
• Between 1980 and 2000, the banks in the sample showed on average lower 
profitability on foreign banking activities than on domestic banking activities. They 
reported a decrease in total profitability when their degree of internationalization was 
higher, and also showed higher variability of profitability. If banks had intended to 
increase their profitability by serving new foreign banking markets and clients, or 
profit from geographical diversification, then on average they did not succeed. 
 
• Banks with different internationalization strategies realized different returns for 
shareholders. Banks that either strongly or moderately increased their 
internationalization activities showed the lowest shareholder returns. On the other 
hand, banks that retreated from internationalization activities and (re)focused on their 
domestic banking business generated the highest shareholder returns. But banks with 
established internationalization strategies, showing a long term commitment to their 
international banking activities, generated the highest shareholder return.  
 
• Similarly, shareholders valued large foreign acquisitions and foreign divestitures 
differently. Large changes in the degree of internationalization led to additional 
shareholder return. With a decrease in internationalisation additional shareholder 
return increased over time. With an increase in internationalization additional 
shareholder return decreased over time. The return-risk ratio improved most with large 
decreases in the degree of internationalization. 
 
Continuing trends? 
  
• Although this study covers the 1980-2000 period, some trends identified might still 
apply for the present and the future. First, banks who have accelerated their 
internationalization activities either have to find the right configuration to make 
internationalization a relative profitable activity, or will have to divest activities 
because it has not found an opportunity for sustainable foreign profitability and 
refocus on domestic activities. Generating relatively stable income from foreign retail 
banking or private banking increases the probability that the bank remains highly 
internationalized, potential for (further) domestic deregulation and growth reduces the 
probability.  
 Similarly, banks that retreated from internationalization can either maintain or 
further decrease internationalization activities, or increase them again: re-
internationalization. Some banks have begun with re-internationalization since 2000, 
but generating sustainable foreign profitability is generally difficult to realize.  
 
 
2 Internationalization patterns 
 
The world's largest banks pursued different internationalization strategies between 1980 
and 2000. Banks retreated as well as increased their internationalization activities. Roughly 
one quarter of the banks remained internationalized, one quarter retreated, while one 
quarter slowly and one quarter strongly internationalized.  
The overall picture has been that in the 1980s the degree of internationalization for 
the largest banks in the world basically did not change (Figure 1). In the 1990s, the degree 
of internationalization systematically increased. But as the difference between average and 
median TNI indicates, the increase was concentrated with a small number of banks. 
 
Figure 1. Internationalization of banks, 1980-2000 
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If banks in a country are considered as separate groups, then the development of 
internationalization activities of banks has differed between countries. There is a certain 
country-of-origin effect in banking. At the beginning of the 1980s, American and British 
banks showed the highest degree of internationalization. During the 1980s, the degree of 
internationalization decreased systematically for American banks, while this applied to 
British banks from the mid-1980s. The ascent of Japanese banks in the late 1980s in the 
international banking arena filled a relative void created by American and British banks in 
the 1980s.  
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Insert 1: About the research 
 
This study adopted several research stages. First, a broad and representative sample of 
banks was selected. The 3 to 5 largest banks by assets with substantial international 
activites were chosen for the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and Japan. In 1995 this sample amounted to 34 banks; 
mergers and acquisitions increased the sample to 44 banks. As a group, these banks 
command over 48% of total global assets of banks between 1980 and 2000. 
The internationalization of banks was investigated between 1980 and 2000. This 
long period was chosen to take full advantage of the disclosed geographical information, 
especially for American and British banks. Also, 1980 as a starting year is a natural 
demarcation point in the internationalization strategies of banks. In particular, the 
emerging market loans crises from 1981 onwards initiated for many banks a decade of 
reorientation on the role of their international activities. Arguably, the strategic 
reorientation in the 1980s also has substantially influenced internationalization activities of 
banks in the 1990s. An assumption when using a long time period is that banks and their 
managers have a long term memory: what the bank did in 1980 has relevance for their 
activities in 1990 or even later. A long time period is not uncommon in management 
studies - well known examples are "In Search of Excellence" by Peters and Waterman 
(1982) or "Built to Last" by Collinas and Portas (1993) – but longitudinal studies covering 
most leading companies of one sector are relatively rare.   
Next, a database was developed for this study, collecting internationalization data 
for different indicators. For each bank the degree of internationalization was calculated 
which yielded an internationalization index for each bank (see next insert). This provided 
the basis for developing a strategic typology of internationalization. Different phases of 
expansion, restructuring and retreat were combined with a scan of client-arena-products 
targeted by the bank during these periods. A choice was made not to look at intended or 
announced strategies but at realized strategies, compiling information from newspapers, 
annual reports and other sources. This led to the identification of five different types of 
realized internationalization strategies: Moderate, Accelerating, Established, Retreating 
and Imploding.  
The types of realized internationalization strategies were then used in the next 
research phase, focussing on the effectiveness of internationalization. First, it was 
investigated which incentives are relevant for the internationalization of banks. With a 
pooled data regression model, several tests were performed, varying the time period, 
grouping the data per country or per realized strategy. Performance was addressed by first 
looking at the available data: difference in foreign and domestic profitability was 
calculated, based on the available data from annual reports. Alternative tests were set up to 
determine a broader relationship between performance and the degree of 
internationalization. Finally, integration was pursued by determining the relationship 
between incentives to internationalize, performance and shareholder return for the five 
different types of realized internationalization strategies. 
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The internationalization activities of Japanese banks increased until the early 1990s, 
their descent followed from the mid 1990s and marks the influence of a crisis in the 
domestic market. Continental European banks showed the strongest increase in degree of 
internationalization between 1980 and 2000; the largest banks from the Netherlands, 
Germany, Spain, France and Switzerland first steadily in the 1980s and then accelerating 
their degree of internationalization since the mid-1990s.   
 
Internationalization cycle 
The case studies suggest the following stylized internationalization cycle: starting in the 
1970s, bank internationalization originally consisted of setting up banking activities in 
financial centers and economic centers. Part of this was related to incentives such as 
"follow-the-client" or aimed at increasing overall profitability. Additionally, restructuring 
and expansion in the domestic markets might have been cumbersome for some and 
impossible for other banks, further stimulating internationalization. Regulatory 
ideosyncracies in the home market might be one explanation for this, but also the existence 
of a home bias 'inertia': restructuring the domestic retail networks in the early 1980s might 
have been more difficult with vested interests in the home country such as labor unions. In 
particular, banks in smaller countries had to expand abroad for fear of anti-trust regulation 
at home. 
 
Figure 2. Stylized Internationalization patterns of  banks 
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For most banks during the 1980s, international expansion supported their domestic 
strategies and was relatively small compared to the home country. So banks did not have to 
attract additional capital. When banks initiated larger acquisitions in the late 1980s and 
1990s, external capital became more important as a source of financing. (Domestic and 
 
Insert 2: The degree of internationalization 
 
There are different approaches to measure a banks’ degree of internationalization. 
Estimating the degree of internationalization of a firm or a bank is to some extent arbitrary. 
An initial approach could be to construct a single item indicator; however the use of a 
single item indicator increases the potential error of measurement because it might be more 
prone to external shocks. An alternate approach is to combine several indicators into one 
index.  
This study applies three single item indicators, which are combined in a composite 
index to analyze the degree of internationalization of a bank, the Transnationality Index 
(TNI). The TNI is one of the most cited indicators for internationalization. The index is 
expressed as a percentage and calculated as an unweighted average of 1) the foreign assets 
to total assets ratio, 2) the foreign gross income to total gross income ratio and 3) the 
foreign employment to total employment ratio.  
The TNI by definition moves between 0 and 100. An internationalization index that 
incorporates income, staff and assets captures a richer picture of the bank's foreign 
activities than that which would be captured by income, staff and assets separately. 
Another attractive characteristic is that the TNI dampens the effect of finance companies or 
off-shore funding constructions. A substantial amount of foreign (relative to total) assets 
can a priori be expected to be located in tax havens or countries with lenient fiscal regimes. 
Such reported assets would, however, be accompanied by low number of employees. 
Combining both employees and assets in the TNI would then create a more balanced view. 
The same argument also applies to investment banking activities that are concentrated in 
financial centers outside the home country; these activities tend to generate a relatively 
high degree of income with few employees.  
A disadvantage of the TNI might be that the construction of such an index cannot 
take account of the effects of technological change. Changes in technology can for 
example raise productivity and increase the assets or income per employee.I If these 
changes are distributed evenly over the total bank organization then its effect on the TNI is 
probably limited. If the ratio of foreign assets per foreign employee increases in the same 
amount as the ratio of domestic assets per domestic employee, then technological change 
has no effect on the TNI. From the mid 1990s however technological advances have had 
other geographic distribution effects. For example, the development of "internet" banks 
like ING Direct implies that the share of foreign assets and foreign income increases while 
staff and operations working for the internet bank basically remain at home. This might 
potentially depress the true extent of internationalization measured by the TNI. 
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foreign) shareholders not only provided additional capital to expand. They also followed 
management more closely, and pressed for changes when expected results were not 
delivered. An increasing shareholder role and foreign profitability that was below 
expectations, led bank managemers to change objectives in the mid 1990s: profitability 
should be internally generated, the domestic base strengthened and foreign activities 
divested if they did not contribute satisfactorily to total profitability. 
 
Realized internationalization strategies 
An analysis of banks' internationalization activities clustered per country is too coarse. For 
example, Chase Manhattan and Bank of America retreated from internationalization 
activities in the 1980s, while Citicorp and J.P.Morgan remained committed to international 
banking activities. To analyze the pattern of realized internationalization strategies, the 
internationalization activities of 44 banks were reviewed individually to determine 
commonalities in realized strategies. The degree of internationalization was measured per 
bank. In combination with the internationalization patterns, several phases in realized 
internationalization activities were identified. Similarities in these sequences over time for 
different banks wwere then used to identify five different realized internationalization 
strategies:  
 
• Accelerating internationalization 
Banks initially develop internationalization activities by setting up branches in major 
economic and financial centers. As a next step international activities are expanded by 
increasingly large foreign bank acquisitions. Finally, the bank has to restructure, to 
consolidate the large foreign acquisitions and to regain or increase its profitability.  
 
• Moderate internationalization 
Banks with Moderate internationalization strategies consider internationalization as a 
support activity of the total bank organization. They develop a foreign branch network 
and bank activities in major foreign economic and financial centers; acquisitions and 
establishment of other international bank activities are a reaction to the 
internationalization activities of other banks, especially banks with Accelerating 
strategies. Ultimately, restructuring also sets in to consolidate activities and (re)gain 
profitability.  
 
• Imploding internationalization 
A fast increase of internationalization activities is often implemented to uphold or 
increase the bank's relative position compared to other competitors. Because the bank 
is unable to directly control the large increase in international activities, prolonged 
financial crises occur. Finally, internationalization activities are divested to raise 
capital; bank managers (under pressure of regulators) refocus their activities on the 
domestic banking market. 
Insert 3: The degree of internationalization (TNI) of the world's largest banks 
 
 
Country Bank  TNI  
  1980 1990 2000 
  
France Agricole 2.3 4.0 17.9 
 BNP 27.6 30.5 47.7 
 Credit Lyonnais 11.3 32.5 25.1 
 Paribas 28.1 39.4 - 
 Societe Generale 29.2 27.4 34.9 
   
Germany Bayerische Hypobank 4.8 4.4 - 
 Bayerische Vereinsbank 4.9 6.5 - 
 HypoVereinsbank - - 36.1 
 Commerzbank 14.8 17.8 26.4 
 Deutsche Bank 9.3 23.6 59.0 
 Dresdner Bank 8.3 8.4 32.5 
 Westdeutsche Landesbank 8.6 12.3 41.2 
   
Spain BBVA na 11.5 56.0 
 BCH na - - 
 Santander na 29.3 59.5 
 Argentaria na -  
   
Switzerland Credit Suisse 26.7 47.5 69.3 
 SBC 41.2 38.6 - 
 UBS 27.9 37.8 65.5 
   
UK Barclays 51.5 44.3 28.5 
 HSBC . 44.4 56.4 
 LloydsTSB 40.9 18.9 15.1 
 Midland Bank 21.4 14.2 . 
 National Westminster 34.7 29.2 24.2 
 Standard Chartered 72.6 77.0 79.7 
   
Netherlands ABN 30.5 - - 
 ABN/Amro - 32.7 72.0 
 Amro 13.5 - - 
 Fortis (bank) - 28.8 33.6 
 ING (bank) 11.0 16.8 61.6 
 Rabobank na 14.5 20.2 
   
USA Bank of America 48.3 21.8 7.6 
 Chase Manhattan 51.7 31.9 28.0 
 Chemical Banking 38.4 15.3 - 
 Citicorp 53.6 41.3 46.1 
 J.P. Morgan 47.7 41.7 - 
 Manufacturers Hanovers 54.6 38.6 - 
   
Japan Dai Ichi Kangyo 29.0 39.6 19.1 
 IBJ 12.1 26.3 28.6 
 Mitsubishi Bank 31.5 33.5 - 
 Sumitomo Bank 36.4 35.0 20.5 
 Tokyo-Mitsubishi - - 40.6 
 Bank of Tokyo 31.4 31.3 - 
   
   
-: bank not in sample. na: not available.   
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• Retreating internationalization 
After a foreign financial or economic crisis, banks reassess their foreign activities and 
shift their focus from international activities to domestic activities. Foreign activities 
are divested to raise capital and/or domestic banking activities are expanded. Both 
effects combined lower the degree of internationalization. 
 
• Established internationalization 
Banks with an already high degree of internationalization at the start of the period 
have been historically committed to international activities. They usually build up 
international activities over a long period.   
 
The five types represent the internationalization of all banks in the sample, and are 
clustered in table 1. Apart from Credit Lyonnais and Midland, representing Imploding 
internationalization, the four other models of internationalization are evenly spread 
between the firms. Insert 4 summarizes the stylised characteristics of the five realized 
internationalization strategies. 
 
Table 1. Banks and their model of internationalization 
 
Accelerating Moderate Imploding Retreating Established 
     
• HypoVereins 
bank 
• BCH 
• ING bank 
• ABN/Amro 
• NMB Bank 
• BBV 
• Paribas 
• Credit Suisse 
• Deutsche 
Bank 
• Dresdner 
Bank 
• Santander 
• UBS 
• WestLB 
• Argentaria 
• Amro 
• Fortis 
• Bayerische 
Hypobank 
• Vereinsbank 
• Agricole 
• Commerzbank 
• IBJ 
• Rabobank 
• Midland 
• Crédit 
Lyonnais 
• Manufacturers 
Hanovers 
• Chemical 
Banking 
• Mitsubishi Bank 
• Bank of America 
• Barclays 
• Chase Manhattan 
• Dai Ichi Kangyo 
• Lloyds TSB 
• National 
Westminster 
• Sumitomo Bank 
• Tokyo-
Mitsubishi 
• ABN 
• HSBC 
• Tokyo 
• SBC 
• J.P. Morgan 
• BNP 
• Citicorp 
• Société 
Générale 
• Standard 
Chartered 
 
     
  
 
Financial systems and internationalization of banks 
Financial systems, financial development and internationalization are intertwined. In 
general three different financial systems can be identified: bank oriented, market oriented 
and government/institution directed financial systems. With market oriented financial 
systems (for example the United States or the United Kingdom), the allocation process is 
mainly determined by market prices, and a substantial part of the banks´ main activities, 
  
Insert 4:  Realized internationalization strategies 
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maintain relative 
position to Accelerating, 
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and streamline 
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A. Balanced growth of 
foreign and domestic 
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B. Increase in domestic 
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foreign disinvestments, 
either first mover or 
reaction to domestic 
consolidation 
C. Balanced growth 
D. Increase in foreign 
activities, focused on 
regions/activities  
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-Amro, Fortis,  
 Rabobank 
-Bayerische Hypobank,  
 Vereinsbank, 
 Commerzbank  
 Crédit Agricole  
-Argentaria 
-IBJ 
 
-NMB Bank, ING Bank, 
ABN Amro 
-Paribas 
-Deutsche Bank,  
 Dresdner Bank, 
 Westdeutsche LB  
-Santander, BBV 
-UBS, Credit Suisse 
-Crédit Lyonnais 
-Midland Bank 
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 Chemical Banking,  
 Bank of America,  
 Chase Manhattan 
-Mitsubishi Bank,  
 Dai Ichi Kangyo, 
 Sumitomo Bank 
-Barclays, Lloyds TSB, 
  National Westminster 
-ABN 
-Tokyo-Mitsubishi,  
  Bank of Tokyo 
-HSBC,  
  Standard Chartered 
-SBC 
-J.P. Morgan, Citicorp 
-BNP, Société Générale 
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is performed by capital markets. With bank-oriented financial systems (for example 
Germany or France), the price process still is important, but the bank itself also plays an 
important part in the allocation process. Finally, in government/institution-oriented 
systems (such as Japan), banks can be instrumental in achieving the government's 
objectives.  
Within the framework of internationalization, results of the study however suggest 
the existence of basically two different financial systems: continental European banks 
versus the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan. This grouping is based on three 
strategic characterics (Table 2). The classification of banks in different strategic types 
showed that there is a relatively large concentration of British and American banks, 
representing the market based system, in the Retreating and Established strategy types. On 
the other hand, European continental banks were relatively well represented in the 
Moderate and Accelerating strategy types, representing the bank based system. Japanese 
banks were evenly distributed over most categories.  
 
Table 2. Difference in financial development and internationalization  
 
United Kingdom, United States, Japan Continental Europe 
  
• Relatively many Retreating 
internationalization strategies 
• Relatively many Accelerating 
internationalization strategies 
• Home of the world's largest financial 
centers 
• Regional financial centers 
• Negative relationship between financial 
development indicators and 
internationalization of banks.  
• Negative relationship between 
financial development indicators and 
internationalization of banks. 
  
 
 
When considering internationalization, market oriented versus bank oriented financial 
systems might not be a useful distinction: the relationship between financial development 
indicators and TNI pointed into another direction. For the continental European banks, 
strong relationships between financial development indicators and TNI were found. These 
relationships broke down for the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom, all in a 
similar fashion. These three countries share a number of similarities: they have or have had 
leading financial bank systems in the world and they have the largest financial centers. The 
United States and Japan share additional similarities, such as in the regulatory system (the 
Japanese regulatory system was initially designed by the Americans) and the low degree of 
banking concentration. 
 
 
 
3 Why banks internationalize 
Since the early 1980s, nearly half the world´s largest banks have established significant 
international operations by setting up branches, engaging in joint ventures or acquiring 
foreign activities. To understand why banks have internationalized, this study first 
investigated the relationship between incentives to internationalize and the degree of 
internationalization of banks. A review of existing research identified three groups of 
incentives to internationalize: Extrinsic, Bank intrinsic, and Sector intrinsic incentives 
(Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Investigated incentives to internationalize 
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Extrinsic incentives to internationalize stress the relationships with host governments, and 
its effects on host economies. These incentives relate to “following clients” strategies to 
foreign export markets and differences between countries in net interest margins, economic 
growth, financial development and regulation. Bank intrinsic incentives to internationalize 
center on minimizing costs, maximizing efficiency and optimizing competitiveness. 
Hypothesized intrinsic incentives in this study relate to economies, profitability and 
capitalization as incentives to internationalize. Finally, Sector intrinsic incentives represent 
common ground between extrinsic motives and intrinsic motives such as the relative 
position a bank wants to attain relative to competitors, achieved by market power.  
 
Main findings 
The relationship between incentives to internationalize and the degree of 
internationalization was investigated using a pooled regression analysis for the 44 banks in 
the 1980-2000 period. The main findings are: 
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• Banks following their clients abroad were more motivated by their clients' exports 
than by the foreign direct investment of their clients. 
• Net interest margins were a determining factor to internationalize in the 1980s, 
shifting towards fee income in the 1990s. 
• Financial development was found to be positively related to the degree of 
internationalization for continental European banks, but negatively related to the 
United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom, the countries with the world's largest 
financial centers and securities markets. 
• A higher degree of market concentration was positively related to the degree of 
internationalization; furthermore individual bank tended to be sensitive to the overall 
degree of internationalization.  
• Profitability, capitalization and efficiency also explained the degree of 
internationalization. Their explanatory power tended to be higher in the 1990s than in 
the 1980s, and was higher for banks that followed Retreating or Established 
internationalization strategies, than for Moderate or Accelerating strategies. 
 
Shifting importance of incentives to internationalize 
Estimations of the relationship between incentives and the degree of internationalization 
for different periods indicated that shifts in importance have taken place between 1980 and 
2000. In Figure 4, a likely shift between incentives over time is shown, as well as possible 
explanations.  
 
Figure 4. Relative importance of incentives and possible explanations 
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Insert 5.  Rabobank: moderate internationalization strategy 
 
Dutch based Rabobank is a diversified 
financial services organization with a 
cooperative status. Founded in 1972, 
the bank has a strong domestic base, 
and builds on its agricultural roots in its 
foreign expansion strategies.   
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The Rabobank is representative for banks with a moderate internationalization strategy: to 
a large degree, internationalization is considered as a support activity of the total bank 
organization.  
• 1980s: broad international expansion. Foreign activities to serve its domestic clients 
formed the core of its internationalization strategy in the 1970s and 1980s. To join the 
international capital market operations, Rabobank set up activities in London and New 
York. Rabobank actively participated in consortium banks and alliances, with UNICO 
as a linking pin within this strategy. 
• 1990-1995: broad domestic and international expansion. In the 1990s, the bank 
moved towards a bankassurance model acquiring insurer Interpolis and asset manager 
Robeco. It was the basis for a three pillar strategy: in the home market, Rabobank built 
its organization into a broad financial service provider, strengthening the retail, 
corporate finance and asset management side, remaining loyal to the legacy of earlier 
decades. Rabobank strengthened ties with existing UNICO partners, especially 
German DG bank and Spanish bank Banco Popular.  
• 1996-1998: increased international expansion. The rising costs of the foreign branch 
network forced a reorientation, and in 1996 the bank decided to provide corporate, 
investment and private banking services to clients in the agricultural, pharmaceutical 
and food industries in the major regions, initiating a string of acquisitions worldwide. 
Somewhat more opportunistic, its London branch was heavily upgraded in 1997 into 
an investment banking department, trying to reap the fruits of booming securities 
markets. Investment banking was scaled down in 1999 after disappointing results.  
• 1999-2000: Restructuring. However, Rabobank suffered a string of setbacks forcing it 
to reconsider its strategy: two announced large scale mergers fell through and its 
investment banking activities delivered poor results. In 1998 Rabobank unsuccessfully 
contemplated a full-fledged merger with Achmea. An alternative, to combine the 
investment banking activities with DG Bank in a joint venture, fell through. Also, the 
domestic cost efficiency was lagging in comparison with other competitors. These 
events signalled a period where management reconsidered the bank’s strategy, and in 
anticipation of a new direction cost cutting measures were announced. 
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Extrinsic incentives (such as "follow your client" or spreads) may have been declining in 
importance over a longer period. While they did explain internationalization well in the 
1970s, their explanatory power decreased, especially in the 1990s. On the other hand, Bank 
intrinsic incentives (capitalization, performance) might have increased substantially in 
importance. The Basle Accord marked the development towards a regulatory framework 
where banks had to be adequately capitalized; growing dependence on capital markets 
meant that banks increasingly focused on performance as a driver for shareholder 
performance. Sector intrinsic incentives to internationalize, such as herding, might have 
played an important role in the 1970s and 1980s. The increasing role of Bank intrinsic 
incentives meant that herding as an incentive shifted from an organizational level to a 
product-client level. Fewer banks in the 1990s set themselves goals in terms of asset size 
or market share compared to competitors, but this might well have taken place in specific 
markets for specific clients.  
 
The incentives: an elaboration 
The seven major incentives to internationalize can be discussed in more detail. 
 
1. Follow your client 
The traditional incentives to internationalize, where banks follow their clients abroad, 
were not confirmed in this study. The estimated relationship between exports and the 
degree of internationalization was positive, but the coefficient showed no statistical 
significance. The model was also re-estimated per country. For most countries a 
negative relationship between exports and TNI was found between 1980 and 1989, on 
average changing to a positive relationship between 1990 and 2000. Trade as an 
incentive to internationalize has been one of the traditional explanations in 
internationalization theories. It could be that this ‘traditional’ explanation had some 
weight prior to 1980, but it lost its explanatory power in the 1980s as banks began to 
develop internationalization strategies for other reasons. Export became important 
again in the 1990s when regional integration such as the European Union led to a 
further intensification of trade relationships.  
A relationship between outward foreign direct investments (FDI) and TNI, also 
a traditional incentive to internationalize, was not confirmed for the total sample. Re-
estimating per country, even negative relationships between FDI and TNI were found. 
If the regression results of exports are compared to FDI, then exports have more 
explanatory power for the degree of internationalization than FDI. In other words,  
(stable) trade relationships were more important incentives for banks to 
internationalize than the (more volatile) foreign direct investments of firms. 
 
2.  Increase earnings 
Two other variables to measure the relationship between the degree of 
internationalization and extrinsic incentives were the bank's net interest margin and 
fee income, i.e. non interest income as share of gross income. Fee income has been 
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especially relevant to internationalization activities of banks in financial centers, 
where investments banks were set up or acquired. A low net interest margin as an 
incentive to internationalize was confirmed for the 1980-1989 period but rejected for 
1990-2000 while a higher degree of domestic fee income as an incentive to 
internationalize was rejected for the 1980-1989 period and supported for 1990-2000. 
This might suggest that fee income has taken over the role of net interest margin as 
incentive to internationalize: the decline of net interest margin in the 1980s positively 
influenced the degree of internationalization, while fee income in the 1990s was 
positively related to the degree of internationalization. This finding supports the 
increased role of (foreign) investment banking activities of banks, especially in the 
1990s.  
 
3. Exploit financial and economic developments of the home country 
The financial structure and financial development of countries influence the 
internationalization of banks. While the level in GDP per capita in the home country is 
positively related to the degree of internationalization, the growth in GDP in the home 
country on the other hand is negatively related to the degree of internationalization. 
This paradox can be explained since relatively richer countries (with a high GDP per 
capita) tend to have banks with a higher degree of internationalization, unless there are 
domestic economic growth opportunities.  
The relationships between TNI and the home country's bank assets, GDP per 
capita, and market capitalization were expected to be positive, and have been 
confirmed for France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland and the Netherlands. On the other 
hand, relationships between financial development of a country and the degree of 
internationalization were rejected for American, British and Japanese banks. These 
countries have in common that they harbor the largest financial centers: the natural 
domestic base for generating fee income might explain the negative relationship 
between market capitalization and TNI.  
 
4. Regulation 
To assess the effect of changes in regulation on the degree of internationalization of 
banks, changes in TNI before and after major regulatory events were calculated. These 
events included the liberalization or deregulation of major financial markets, the 
implementation of the Basle capital adequacy rules and the American regulation for 
foreign banking activities. In general, mixed results were found. There was no 
relationship visible in changes in the TNI of banks (in the country of regulatory 
change) before and after major financial deregulation events such as the liberalization 
of financial markets in the United Kingdom in 1986 or France. Similar, the 
implementation of the Basle capital adequacy rules for all countries in the sample 
effective in 1993 showed no specific change in the TNI for banks in the country 
before and after the implementation.  
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5. Market concentration  
A higher degree of market concentration in the home country is positively related to 
the degree of internationalization. Expected limited domestic growth opportunities in 
terms of banking market share are supported as an incentive to internationalize. 
Market concentration was also found to have a negative relationship with GDP 
Growth or GDP per capita. This indicates that market concentration in itself is an 
independent incentive to internationalize, and not directly tied to the size of the 
economy.  
 
6. Herding 
The degree of internationalization of the total sample, approximating a herding effect, 
also had a positive relationship with the degree of internationalization. When banks 
were clustered by realized internationalization strategy and country, herding was also 
observed. Japanese, American and British banks have tended to show Established and 
Retreating internationalization strategies between 1980 and 2000; German, Dutch, 
Swiss and Spanish banks were inclined to have Moderate and Accelerating 
internationalization strategies. French banks could not easily be clustered in one of the 
categories. With the exception of Japan, this clustering could also be interpreted as a 
dichotomy between bank-oriented and market-oriented financial systems. Banks in 
market-oriented financial systems (the United States and the United Kingdom) tended 
to develop Established and Retreating internationalization strategies; continental 
European banks on the other hand leaned towards Moderate and Accelerating 
international expansion strategies.  
 
7. Efficiency, profitability 
For the whole sample, support was found for bank intrinsic incentives to 
internationalize: efficient banks (i.e. with a lower cost to income ratio) show a higher 
degree of internationalization, and so do banks that have a higher profitability and are 
better capitalized. Cost-to-income, capitalization and profitability are variables that a 
bank can influence; they tended to have more explanatory power in the 1990s than in 
the 1980s. When the relationship between incentives and the degree of 
internationalization was grouped per realized strategy type, an observation was that 
cost-to-income, capitalization and profitability had more explanatory power for banks 
with Established and Retreating internationalization strategies, than for banks with 
Moderate and Accelerating internationalization strategies. 
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Insert 6. Deutsche Bank: accelerating internationalization strategy 
 
Deutsche Bank fits the stereotype of the 
European bank in search of a truly global 
strategy. As one of Europe's largest banks, it 
has focused on developing a retail bank 
presence in Europe in the 1980s, shifting to 
acquiring a leading position in worldwide 
investments banking in the 1990s.  
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Initially, Deutsche Bank's Accelerating internationalization strategy began by setting up 
branches in major economic and financial centers. Next, international activities were 
expanded by increasingly large foreign bank acquisitions. Finally, a restructuring period 
set in, consolidating the large foreign acquisitions and regain profitability.  
• 1970s-1985: Entry in international banking markets. Throughout the 1970s, Deutsche 
Bank systematically set up its branch network world wide. This development was 
largely over in the early 1980s but Deutsche Bank continued to open branches or 
convert representative offices to branches, though not with the intensity of the “flag-
planting competition” of British banks.  
• 1986-1998: Broad international expansion. In 1986, Deutsche Bank started a 
reorganization to increase its market position in securities trading, increase its 
presence in other high-growth international markets and strengthen bank’s position in 
retail banking.  Retail banking networks were acquired in Italy (1986 and 1993), Spain 
(1993) and Belgium (1998). It was unsuccessful in acquiring a retail network in 
France, and decided in 1999 to set up 15 branches for wealthy customers. The growth 
in the capital markets was primarily accomplished in two large steps: the acquisition 
of Morgan Grenfell in 1989, and the acquisition of Bankers Trust in 1998. 
Subsequently, the bank’s headquarters for its investment banking activities were 
transferred to Morgan Grenfell in London. Deutsche Bank’s aim was to also to 
become a sizeable participant in the wholesale banking activities in the United States. 
This was achieved with the sale of Bankers Trust to Deutsche Bank in 1998.  
• 1999-2000: Restructuring. Increasing its German market shae was a permanent issue 
for Deutsche Bank in the 1990s. It unsuccessfully negotiated a merger with domestic 
competitor Dresdner Bank in 1999, failing to agree on integrating their investment 
banking activities. The restructuring of domestic operations had to be done alone, and 
Deutsche Bank created "Deutsche Bank 24", its retail banking unit, by combining 
retail and direct bank activities (clicks and bricks) in 1999. After restructuring, 
profitability increased in 2000, and the bank moved away from the concept that retail 
banking was a costly but necessary burden for the bank. 
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4 Performance and shareholder value 
Have banks become more profitable through internationalization, and have shareholders 
gained by it? To get an answer to this question, the relationship between the degree of 
internationalization and performance was analyzed. Performance was analyzed from the 
perspective of the bank and from the perspective of the shareholder. The main findings are: 
 
• The banks studied showed on average a lower profitability on foreign banking 
activities than on domestic banking activities, and reported a decrease in total 
profitability when their degree of internationalization was higher.  
 
• Similarly, the banks also showed higher variability of profitability with an increase in 
internationalization. If banks had intended to increase their profitability by serving 
new foreign banking markets and clients, or profit from geographical diversification, 
then on average they seem not to have succeeded. 
 
• The study identified bank performance as a major driver for shareholder return. Since 
internationalization leads to lower performance, more internationalization indirectly 
has lowered shareholder return. Banks with Accelerating internationalization 
strategies and Moderate shareholder return showed the lowest shareholder return 
between 1980 and 2000. Banks with Retreating internationalization strategies on the 
other hand created the highest shareholder return, as well as banks with long 
Established international banking activities. 
 
No additional performance by foreign activities 
In the first analysis existing annual report data was used to examine the relationship 
between the degree of internationalization and profitability, measured as profit before tax 
as a percentage of assets. Between 25% of the banks in 1980 and 50% in 2000 reported on 
foreign and domestic profitability and assets, so the results do not apply for the whole 
sample. The difference in reported domestic and foreign performance was calculated, 
showing that profitability of foreign activities on average has been lower than profitability 
of domestic activities. This negative difference in profitability is mainly concentrated 
between 1983 and 1990, indicating that the years of entry and exit matter to total 
profitability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Difference between foreign and domestic profitability (profit before tax as % total assets) 
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To establish analyses that applied to the whole sample, the relationship between 
total profitability, measured as profit before tax as a percentage of capital and reserves, and 
the degree of internationalization was examined. For most banks and most time periods, 
there is a negative relationship between total profitability and the degree of 
internationalization.  
 
Figure 6. Relationship between profitability and the degree of internationalization, for different periods. 
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An exception was between 1981 and 1985 when there existed a positive linear 
relationship between profitability and TNI; 1986-1990 showed on the other hand an 
opposite relationship. Between 1991 and 2000 the linear relationship between profitability 
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and TNI broke down: profitability decreased with an increase in TNI and subsequently 
increased again with further increases in TNI, resembling a weak V-shaped form.  
Another analysis estimated realized foreign and domestic profitability for each 
individual bank, based on the accounting definition that asset weighted foreign and 
domestic profitability adds up to total profitability, where profitability is profit before tax 
as a percentage of total assets. Using foreign and domestic asset weights and benchmark 
profitability for foreign and domestic profitability, the estimated differences between 
foreign and domestic profitability were calculated. Here, the estimated difference in 
foreign and domestic profitability for the whole sample became systematically negative. 
The different analyses therefore support the conclusion that foreign profitability on 
average has been lower than domestic profitability for banks in the sample between 1980 
and 2000. An objection usually raised by banks in their annual reports is that for reported 
figures, the allocation of foreign and domestic profitability is to some extent arbitrary 
because some financial services generated are consumed in more than one place. 
Examining the relation between the degree of internationalization and total profitability 
took this objection into consideration, but here too an overall negative relationship 
between the degree of internationalization and total profitability was found. 
Variability of profitability increases with internationalization 
While internationalization might not on average improve overall profitability, another 
argument would be that internationalization leads to more stable profitability through 
geographical diversification. This effect was examined by calculating variability of 
profitability, measured as the five year standard deviation of profit before tax as a 
percentage of capital and reserves.  A finding was that variability of profitability increased 
with a higher degree of internationalization. This suggests that the banks in the sample 
were on average not able to generate additional profitability (reaping internalization 
advantages) and neither to generate more stable earnings (profit from geographical 
diversification). 
Similarly, another hypothesis was that geographical diversification advantages 
should allow a bank to generate more stable results and improve its return-to-risk ratio, i.e 
average profitability (return) as a ratio of the standard deviation of profitability (risk). 
Having established that foreign activities do not structurally generate more return, the 
burden of proof lies with the reduction of risk. However, no relationship exists between 
TNI and risk. Combining the results for risk and return, internationalization in general is 
negatively related to the level of the return-risk ratio.  
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Insert 7. HSBC: established internationalization strategy 
 
HSBC began its internationalization strategy 
as a HongKong based bank with close ties 
to the United Kingdom. Expanding in 
several countries, the bank moved its 
headquarters to the United Kingdom in 1991 
by acquiring Midland Bank. Its worldwide 
presence as a large diversified banking 
organization was enhanced in the 1990s by 
buying banking activities in Brazil and in 
the United States.  
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HSBC, a bank with an Established internationalization strategy, has historically upheld a 
high degree of internationalization. Historically committed to international activities, 
HSBC has built up international activities over a long period.   
• 1980-1992: Broad expansion. In the late 1970s and into the 1980s, China began to 
open up for foreign business. The bank bought operations in the United States 
(notably Marine Midland) and Canada, initially to capitalize on business between 
China and the United States and Canada, much of which was transacted through Hong 
Kong since China lacked financial infrastructure until the 1980s. HSBC was located in 
HongKong, uncertainty about its return to China led HSBC to gain a major foothold in 
the United Kingdom. In 1987, pressed to reduce its independence on Hong Kong, it 
took an equity stake in Midland. Midland bank was purchased in 1992 and – as part of 
the agreement to buy Midland - in 1993 HSBC formed HSBC holdings, transferring 
its headquarters from Hong Kong to London. 
• 1993-2000: Broad expansion. The strategy of HSBC in the mid 1990s has been to 
build the world’s biggest financial services group, presenting itself as a contender of 
Citigroup. HSBC took a different approach to investment banking than competitors 
like J.P. Morgan, and Deutsche Bank, building a far more modest investment banking 
unit, emulating Barclays Capital Market activities. HSBC began to expand further in 
Asia, expanding in Malaysia and China. In 1997 it expanded in South America, 
buying banks in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru. In 1999 it bought a controlling 
stake in South Korea’s government-owned Seoulbank. It also bought Republic New 
York and Safra Republic Holdings, doubling HSBC’s private banking business and 
adding 426 branches in New York State. In 2000, HSBC bought Credit Commercial 
de France for 11 billion euros, adding 1 million French customers and completing 
Europe’s largest ever cross-border banking acquisition. Also in 2000, HSBC formed a 
1 billion US dollar joint venture with US securities firm Merrill Lynch to offer online 
brokerage services to wealthy clients. 
 
  
Figure 7: Relationship between return/risk of profitability and internationalization. 
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Shareholder return  
To analyze the relationship between total shareholder return (TSR) and degree of 
internationalization (TNI) for the whole sample, a simple model was developed and 
estimated. TNI, and change in TNI were found to have a positive relationship with 
shareholder return in line with the hypothesis, especially between 1990 and 2000. But the 
estimates are in general non-significant.  
Shareholders clearly attached different valuations for different realized 
internationalization strategies. Retreating and Established banks generated the highest total 
shareholder return, whether this is measured in absolute returns or adjusted for country 
averages. These groups include relatively many American and British banks. Moderate 
and Accelerating banks generated the least shareholder return, in spite of Accelerating 
banks having attracted relatively large amounts of capital to fund their (foreign) activities. 
The high TSR for Retreating banks supports research that for example shareholders in the 
United States experienced negative abnormal returns when foreign acquisitions were 
announced; with this type of realized internationalization strategy on average more foreign 
divestments than acquisitions have been announced.  
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Additional analyses considered the relationship between risk, return and the degree 
of internationalization. No support was found that the level of internationalization is a 
predictor for out- or underperformance in the consecutive periods. In general, a higher 
degree of internationalization is negatively related to additional shareholder return, albeit 
non significant. On the other hand, performance had significant explanatory power for 
shareholder return. 
 
Figure 8: Total shareholder return for different internationalization strategies 
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When TNI decreased, a finding was that the bank share's return/risk profile 
improved. The return to risk ratio was calculated as annualized TSR (return) as a ratio of 
annualized standard deviation of TSR (risk). Similar to the previous analyses for return and 
risk, the results are not statistically significant though. It was also considered what the 
impact of large changes in TNI was on risk and return. Changes were defined as large 
when TNI increased or decreased with more than 10% compared to a year earlier; these 
large changes have always been caused by a large acquisition or divestiture. Banks who 
decreased their TNI with more than 10% generated on average more shareholder return in 
the years after the change, while the risk steadily declined after an initial increase. The 
return-risk ratio of banks with decreasing TNI’s improved the most in the years shortly 
after the change in TNI. 
When banks increased their internationalization activities and raised TNI with more 
than 10%, shareholder return was relatively high in the years of the TNI change, steadily 
decreasing in the years afterwards but still remaining positive. The volatility of the 
shareholder return increased in the year of change, remaining at broadly the same level for 
the subsequent years. On average, the return-risk ratio of the banks with a large increase in 
foreign banking activities improved slightly. 
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5 The future of international banking 
This study has primarily provided a contemporary analysis of realized internationalization 
strategies of banks in the 1980–2000 period. In this section possible implications for 
internationalization of banks in the near future are considered: can something be said of 
future internationalization developments, and what consequences might this have for 
shareholders? Three future developments are considered. First, which banks are most 
likely to gain in the near future from internationalization? Next, what effects would the 
further European integration have on the internationalization of banks. Finally, what role 
will financial systems play? 
Future internationalization 
Internationalization activities of banks changed considerably between 1980 and 2000. In 
1980, American and English banks were at the helm of internationalization. Japanese 
banks dominated the international scene in 1990. By 2000 many European banks had 
raised internationalization to new, unprecedented heights, perhaps only matched by the 
internationalization of banks in the colonial system at the start of the 20th century. The 
average degree of internationalization for the sample did increase, but not dramatically: the 
degree of internationalization (measured by TNI) moved around 30% in the 1980s, and 
increased to 40% at the end of the 1990s.  
There are similarities observable between the early 1980s and the late 1990s. In the 
early 1980s, American and English banks had to make strategic choices with regard to 
their internationalization activities just as Dutch, German, Spanish and Swiss banks had to 
reconsider the role of their foreign banking activities at the end of the 1990s. In the early 
1980s, banks were confronted with the decline of a smooth source of foreign income, the 
LDC loans; by the late 1990s banks were confronted with the decline of stockmarkets 
reducing both fee income and the attractiveness of the stock markets as a source of foreign 
acquisition financing. A large number of banks in the sample undertook some form of 
restructuring in 1999 and 2000, and continued this in the years after. While the decrease in 
stock markets from 2000 onwards might be alleviated, other triggers of strategic change 
are bound to follow, such as financial crises. 
Ultimately, internationalization of banks has been a mixed blessing for shareholders 
over a longer period. Banks with long established foreign bank activities (the Established 
banks) generated in the long run as a group the highest shareholder return, similar to banks 
who substantially decreased the role of foreign bank activities (the Retreating banks). On 
the other hand, banks who either increased their internationalization activities steadily (the 
Moderate banks) or with increasing pace (the Accelerating banks) have generated the 
lowest shareholder return. 
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Insert 8. Bank of America: retreating internationalization strategy 
 
The initially California based Bank of 
America was in the 1970s a bank with a 
large worldwide presence. In 20 years, the 
bank transformed into broad financial 
service provider, with a predominant 
domestic focus caused by foreign 
divestitures and large domestic mergers with 
Nationsbank (1998) and recently 
FleetBoston (2003).   
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The internationalization strategy of Bank of America has been retreating: after the foreign 
loan crises in the emerging markets in the early 1980s, the bank reassessed its foreign 
activities and shifed its focus from international activities to domestic activities. Foreign 
activities were divested to raise capital and/or domestic banking activities expanded, 
lowering the degree of internationalization. 
• 1980 Financial crisis. The asset seeking strategy of the 1970s and early 1980s had 
major flaws: operating expenses were hard to control, management had difficulties 
coping with the organization, and the foreign expansion turned out to be over-
ambitious, having lent considerably to LDC’s. 
• 1980s. Foreign retreat, domestic restructuring. Large losses between 1985 and 1987 
forced a restructuring program with three goals. First, the retail and commercial 
banking units were strengthened, since BankAmerica had an extensive distribution 
network. Second, poorly performing lending activities were divested or cut back. 
Third, international activities were cut back. The number of European staff decreased 
from 7,500 to 1,700 in 1994, the number of Latin American countries it was active in 
decreased from 20 to 6. After cutting costs and restructuring bad loans, the bank 
returned to profit in 1988 and steadily increased its financial performance. 
• 1992-2003: Increasing domestic expansion. In 1990 the operations of Bank of 
America were expanded into seven other states by acquiring thrifts. In acquiring 
Security Pacific, Bank of America increased its position in California, increasing total 
assets by 56%. The bank acquired additional banks and mortgage businesses, and in 
1994 Continental Bank was bought. Bank of America and Nationsbank announced 
their merger in 1998. 
2000 renewed international orientation? The Russian crisis, and the merger 
activities between Nationsbank and BankAmerica led the bank in early 1999 to restructure 
its foreign activities, selling its private banking operations in Europe and Asia to UBS, and 
its consumer banking business in Asia to ABN Amro. Simultaneously, it announced that it 
planned to expand its securities activities in at home as well as in the United Kingdom, 
attempting to build it up internally. 
From the shareholder point of view, which banks' internationalization strategies are 
best positioned for the near future? Specifically, Accelerating banks have increased their 
foreign bank activities at the end of the 1990s to such an extent that these banks have 
become comparable in their degree of internationalization to Established banks throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s. Given the relative successful (shareholder) performance of 
Established banks, what banks with Accelerating strategies are likely to emulate the 
success of Established banks? To answer these questions the possible future courses of 
realized internationalization strategies (Moderate, Established, Accelerating, Retreating)1 
are projected in Figure 9. For example, Established banks have a relatively high degree of 
internationalization; the solid line in the figure projects the current degree of 
internationalization into the future, assuming no fundamental change in the role of foreign 
activities in the bank. On the other hand, the dotted arrow shows a possible change in the 
degree of internationalization.  
 
Figure 9. Future directions of internationalization 
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If past experience provides any guidance, then an investment in banks with realized 
Established and Accelerating strategies for the coming decade might be worthwhile, while 
investments in banks with Retreating and Moderate strategies should be considered with 
more caution. 
 
• Established internationalization strategies 
Established banks (such as Citicorp, HSBC) have found a durable balance in the 
1980s and 1990s between foreign and domestic bank activities. These banks have in 
common that their foreign bank activities are broadly based, branching out in 
investment banking, corporate finance as well as retail banking (consumer finance) 
                                                          
1 The realized Imploding internationalization strategies are ignored here, this strategic type applies to only two 
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and asset management. Also, their foreign activities are geographically well 
diversified. Established banks have to maintain the right configuration to keep 
internationalization a relative profitable activity, or the bank might divest activities 
that do not contribute to the total profitability of the bank.   
 
• Accelerating internationalization strategies 
Accelerating banks (examples are Deutsche Bank, ABN Amro, Credit Suisse, UBS, 
Santander) have increased their internationalization activities significantly during the 
1990s and are at a position in the early years of the new millennium similar to 
Established and Retreating banks in the early 1980s. Either they have to find the right 
configuration to make internationalization a relative profitable activity, or the bank 
will divest activities because it has not found an opportunity for sustainable foreign 
profitability and refocus on domestic activities. In other words, Accelerating banks 
have to determine whether they soon will reach the stage of Established banks, or they 
have to reconsider their portfolio of foreign activities and become Retreating banks. In 
the past, both scenarios were rewarded by shareholders. This suggests a paradox: 
banks with Accelerating internationalization strategies have on average delivered the 
least shareholder return in the past but are best positioned to generate the most 
shareholder return in the near future.  
The strategic choice banks with Accelerating strategies have between 
developing either Established or Retreating strategies leads to the question which 
banks with Accelerating strategies have characteristics more similar to banks with 
Established strategies or more similar to Retreating strategies. In other words, what 
banks with Accelerating strategies are likely to evolve into Retreating strategies and 
what banks are likely to develop Established strategies? 
Naturally any future scenario is highly conjectural but to answer this, two 
criterions are introduced. The case studies first indicate that when domestic growth 
opportunities increase, banks favor domestic growth over foreign bank growth. For 
most banks, the first priority is to maintain the (relative) domestic market position, as 
well as seizing the best opportunities to achieve profitability growth or efficiencies. 
Expansion of domestic banking markets (mostly triggered by regulatory changes) led 
to a decrease in internationalization of banks; this applied for American banks, 
English banks and also Japanese banks. Naturally, this criterion does not apply for 
banks with small and/or highly concentrated domestic banking markets, such as the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. Future domestic growth opportunities are however 
relevant for French and German banks where de-mutualization, and (further) 
abolishment of separation between different banking types in the country might be 
future events.  
Second, all major retreats from internationalization have been triggered by a 
financial crisis. While the timing of financial crises cannot be predicted as such, the 
banks that retreated the strongest or earliest were on average banks with large capital 
banks and is therefore difficult to generalize.  
market/investment banking operations. In short, banks with more stable foreign 
funding bases such as foreign retail banks or banks with more stable foreign fee 
income base such as asset management and private banking are probably more likely 
to whither economic and financial adverse conditions than banks with volatile foreign 
activities in capital market/investment banking. This will be used as the second 
criterion; both criterions suggest the following categorization of future development 
(Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10. Accelerating banks' sensitivity to domestic market developments, stability of foreign income 
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German banks with Accelerating strategies (Dresdner Bank, WestDeutsche 
Landesbank and Deutsche Bank) are more likely to retreat from foreign bank activities 
and eventually develop Retreating internationalization strategies. Their potential 
domestic growth opportunities are relatively large; when regulation permits these 
banks might prefer domestic banking growth opportunities over foreign banking 
growth opportunities. Also, these banks are more sensitive to external shocks such as 
financial crises due to their high dependency on (foreign) capital market activities. On 
the other hand, the Swiss, Dutch and Spanish banks have no domestic growth 
opportunities; the Dutch banks ING and ABN Amro have acquired large stable 
funding bases (retail banking operations) outside the Netherlands. Credit Suisse and 
UBS have not acquired retail networks outside Switzerland; UBS has created a 
relatively stable source of foreign income through asset management and private 
banking while Credit Suisse has more focused on expanding in investment banking. In 
other words, ING, ABN Amro, UBS, Santander and BBVA may be the banks who 
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have developed and expanded internationalization activities closest to banks with 
Established internationalization strategies. 
 
• Retreating internationalization strategies 
Similar to Accelerating banks, Banks with Retreating internationalization have two 
strategic alternatives: either to maintain or further decrease internationalization 
activities, or to increase them again (re-internationalization). Lloyds TSB, Barclays 
and JP Morgan Chase have re-internationalized or planned to do so. Lloyds TSB has 
publicly contemplated increasing their internationalization activities in 2000, while 
Barclays has re-internationalized in Spain but on a more subdued scale than its 
European and American expansion activities in the 1980s. Chase decreased its foreign 
bank activities since the mid 1980s but effectively re-internationalized when it 
acquired J.P. Morgan in 2000 which had more than half its operations outside the 
United States. Royal Bank of Scotland also (re-) internationalized by acquiring 
National Westminster. National Westminster decreased its foreign bank activities in 
the 1990s; after the acquisition in March 2000 Royal Bank of Scotland developed a 
specialized internationalization strategy, expanding its United States retail branch 
network with a series of modest acquisitions and developing foreign distribution 
channels for motor insurance activities.  
The re-internationalization of Barclays or J.P.MorganChase is probably not a 
repetition of the internationalization activities in the 1980s. Compared to earlier 
periods, the banks have shown a strong focus on domestic banking activities. Also, 
bank capital has become scarcer than in the 1980s. At the end of 2003 the proposed 
structure and implementation of Basle II introduced a more sophisticated regulatory 
framework for banks and their capital. Whichever structure or implementation route is 
chosen, the allocation of capital to foreign bank activities is bound to be more closely 
monitored and evaluated than in the 1980s. Some internationalization incentives 
remain the same; the announced re-internationalization of Lloyds TSB could be 
interpreted as seeking growth opportunies after domestic expansion activities failed, 
when Lloyds TSB was not allowed to acquire Abbey National in 2000. The other 
Retreating banks have not re-internationalized; Bank of America autonomously 
expanded investment banking operations in London but substantially reduced the 
relative role of its foreign operations when it acquired FleetBoston in 2003. For the 
retreated Japanese banks, the climate for re-internationalization has become more 
favorable but the banks have largely been engaged in domestic mergers to absorb the 
large write off of bad loans, increase profitability and regain solvency.  
 
• Moderate internationalization strategies 
Finally, question marks surround the future shareholder returns of Moderate banks: 
they have the widest range of strategic options available to them, and are probably the 
most diverse bank group of realized strategies. However, most of the Moderate banks 
have as yet sought to increase their degree of internationalization. Fortis for example 
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has essentially stayed focused on the Benelux and Spain, consolidating and integrating 
its bank operations and striving for autonomous growth. Credit Agricole on the other 
boosted its foreign activities since its acquisition of wholesale bank Indosuez in 1994 
but strengthened its domestic focus by acquiring Credit Agricole in 2002.   
 
What road leads to a sustainable and equal profitability development of foreign and 
domestic banking activities? The next table summarizes the hypothesized changes in 
realized internationalization strategies for the near future. The number of banks with 
Established strategies will increase, so will the number of banks with Retreating 
internationalization strategies.   
 
Table 3. Possible changes in future internationalization of banks 
  
Change from 
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BNP Paribas 
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Dresdner Bank 
West LB 
HypoVereinsBank 
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JPMorgan Chase 
Barclays 
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Fortis 
Rabobank 
Commerzbank 
Crédit Agricole 
 
      
      
Note 1: The bank has been renamed SCH. Note 2: Credit Suisse could also be classified as retreating. 
Note 3: Mizuho incorporates IBJ and Dai Ichi Kangyo. Note 4: Lloyds TSB announced a re-internationalization 
in 2000, this has  not materialized between 2000 and 2003. Note 5: Royal Bank of Scotland acquired National 
Westminster in 2000, and continued its foreign banking activities. 
 
 
Insert 9: Credit Lyonnais: imploding internationalization strategy 
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Credit Lyonnais experienced an Imploding internationalization strategy. After a financial 
crisis in the early 1990s, the bank reassessed its foreign activities and had to shift its focus 
from international activities to domestic activities. Foreign activities were divested to raise 
capital, lowering the degree of internationalization. 
• 1980-1984: Broad international expansion. The internationalization of Crédit 
Lyonnais was well underway since the 1970s, establishing a network in Latin 
America, Africa and for a short while the Middle East. Branches in the major financial 
centers were created, and capital market activities expanded. 
• 1985-1993: Increased international expansion. Crédit Lyonnais embraced a universal 
banking concept: while the bank aimed for an important role in the financing as well 
as control of industrial companies. It believed in the need to be present in European 
countries, either through internal growth or by buying foreign banks. The expansion of 
Crédit Lyonnais was directed by government; the bank expanded abroad to assist 
state-owned industrial firms as they sought to compete outside France. It acquired a 
score of banks and industrial holdings between 1989 and 1992 in Europe; this 
aggressive strategy proved to be a risky one after the economic slowdown in 1992. 
Industrial holdings and property loans generated heavy losses. Insufficiently 
controlled subsidiaries caused serious setbacks both in France and abroad. After a 
change of management, staff was cut, operations streamlined and assets sold. 
Mounting heavy losses forced the French government to rescue the bank, first in early 
1994 and then in April 1995.  
• 1994-2000: Restructuring, refocus and international exit. The government provided 
financial assistance which probably worsened the situation, and the bank ran into 
further trouble in 1996. A financial restructuring plan was finally agreed on with the 
French government and approved by the European Commission in 1998. This plan 
included scheduling major sales of foreign assets as well as the privatization of the 
bank by October 1999. The public offering of shares took place in 1999, with Crédit 
Agricole controlling a 10% equity stake. 
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Regional integration: extension of the home market? 
A large degree of foreign activities of European banks (as well as American banks) have 
taken place within European banking markets. Another implication to consider is then the 
consequence of regional integration such as the European Union, representing an economic 
and political extension of the home market and a regional uniformization of the regulatory 
regime. The European integration process accelerated in two periods, between 1988 and 
1991 (in preparation of the Single Market) and between 1996 and 1999 (in preparation of 
the Eurozone). The economic integration programs liberalized capital markets, and the 
introduction of the Euro led to a convergence of monetary policies between the major EU 
countries. With European integration, will the extension of the home market imply similar 
high profitability as domestically, or should expansion in the Eurozone still be considered 
internationalization to a foreign country, with lower foreign performance than domestic as 
this study found? 
Banks have dealt with European integration in several ways: pan-European 
strategies were formulated by National Westminster, Barclays, Deutsche Bank and Crédit 
Lyonnais in the 1980s. They built up a branch network in the major European cities, and 
acquired retail or private banks in European countries, mainly in Germany, France and 
Spain. In the 1990s, a new concept was introduced: the "second home market" in Europe. 
These were acquisitions of foreign banking activities with the expected benefits enjoyed 
domestically (such as a large depositor base). Banks who followed this strategy were ING 
with its 1997 acquisition of Belgian BBL or HSBC who acquired French CCF in 2000. If 
banks view Europe as an extension of their home market, then the findings of this study 
would suggest that this extension in general lowers overall profitability. Is this finding also 
valid for European banks internationalizing in the (integrated) European banking market?  
Supporting the assumption that European integration extends the concept of home 
market are convergence of net interest margins in the Eurozone, the structural removal of 
regulatory barriers, and reduction of fluctuations in GDP growth because economic cycles 
in the Eurozone converge. These developments have in common that differences between 
"domestic" and "foreign" economies within the Eurozone decrease.   
Outwardly, one might interpret the process of European integration for the banking 
markets as following the path taken by American banks since the mid 1990s, where 
ongoing deregulation of interstate banking has led to a natural extension of the home 
market. Deregulation of interstate banking in basically has created new markets with 
similar customers, introducing opportunities for increased efficiency and higher 
profitability. However, European integration cannot be compared to the banking 
deregulation in the United States.  
There are two arguments that do not support the concept of an extension of the 
home market within Europe. First, potential efficiency advantages may be difficult to 
exploit. Consolidation of the banking market moves at different paces in different 
countries; European labor market are considered to be rigid implying that part of the cost-
to-income ratio levels for banks in a country are structural, especially for labor intensive 
retail banking. In other words, efficiencies might be difficult to gain by foreign banking 
acquisitions in Europe. Second, fiscal policies with regard to savings and pensions are not 
harmonized. They determine to a large extent the growth of the savings pool and the 
opportunities to be had. A scenario could be that further European banking consolidation 
follows along these lines: Capital market activities in Europe are to a large extent 
consolidated; dominated by a few American and European banks for the region, with 
complementary dominant positions for country based banks. Consolidation in the 
European banking market is then directed at acquiring foreign retail banks. Capital markets 
are less influenced by local tastes than retail banks, whether this is by a branch network or 
a virtual network.   
 
Financial systems and internationalization 
Finally, what role do (changing) financial systems play in future internationalization of 
banks? On the basis of the relationship between internationalization of banks and financial 
development indicators, two country groups could be established: continental European 
countries and countries with the largest financial centers (the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan). Table 4 shows the two groups.  
 
Table 4. Financial systems and realized internationalization strategies 
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By and large, American, British and Japaneses banks tend to have banks with 
predominantly Retreating and Established strategies. On the other hand, continental 
European banks have shown predominantly Moderate and Accelerating banks. This does 
however not imply that Retreating and Established strategies are specific to market 
oriented financial systems (Japan is here the exception), or that Moderate and Accelerating 
are specific to bank oriented systems (the Netherlands and Switzerland are classified as 
market based). 
Two parallel developments might take place that have similar consequences and are 
bound to interact closely in the near future. Viewed from top down, for most European 
countries the integration of the capital markets may eventually emulate characteristics of 
the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan, countries where the banks in the sample 
showed Retreating and Established internationalization strategies. Viewed from bottom 
up, banks who accelerated their internationalization activities are likely to enter a re-
orientation phase to developed either Established or Retreated internationalization 
strategies.  
The study has also found implications for the role of changing financial systems, 
but more on an individual bank level. An example in this case is Deutsche bank. Its 
expansion in the 1990s in capital market activities in the United States and the United 
Kingdom was financed by equity issues. The bank increased its dependency on 
shareholders, and in the process positioned itself to American and Swiss competitors. 
Transparence and comparability with other banks was improved by separating the differing 
characteristic of a German bank, its industrial shareholdings, were eventually moved 
towards a different holding, clearly indicating that these were for sale. In other words, 
internationalization might create its own momentum to change bank based systems to 
market based systems.  
There is also a cross over from bank oriented systems to market oriented systems 
though. American banks have moved from a specialized bank model in the 1970s to a 
European universal banking model in the 1980s and 1990s; and started to move towards 
the bank assurance model in the late 1990s, with the Travelers-Citicorp merger. If this 
trend were to be followed by more banks, it might support the earlier implication that 
domestic growth opportunities for American banks are further enlarged, shifting focus 
further from international to domestic activities, reducing the degree of 
internationalization.  
Banking Across Borders
Since the 1980s, many of the largest banks in the world have
increased their foreign activities dramatically. Currently, international
capital and banking markets are more intertwined than ever, making
a correct assessment of the costs and benefits of internationalization
a serious matter for bank management, regulators as well as share-
holders. This study contributes to a better understanding of the inter-
nationalization of banks. The study appraises to what extent banks
internationalized because of internal, institutional or sectoral incen-
tives. The internationalization strategies of the world’s largest banks
in eight countries between 1980 and 2000 are described and analyzed.
These banks have dominated the internationalization of banking.
Strategic commonalities and differences are identified on the basis
of a strategic typology developed for this study. 
The central research question deals with the effectiveness of interna-
tionalization. Using a self constructed internationalization database,
differences are estimated between foreign and domestic performance,
and the effects on shareholder return. A higher degree of internatio-
nalization has on average not contributed to bank performance.
Similarly, most shareholders have not gained by more internationa-
lization.
The study also tries to address the future outlook for international
banking - how will the internationalization of banks proceed? The
potential for further financial deregulation in the home country,
uncertainty on the international regulatory regime, and the business
mix of the bank are likely drivers for the bank’s future internationa-
lization strategy and profitability enhancement.
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